

THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS

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ABSTRACT

The peace process between Egypt and Israel started when Anwar Sadat came to power in Egypt. Sadat sought to restore international relations with the western hemisphere, which were broken by the Six-Day war. President Sadat genuinely wanted peace with Israel and he visited Jerusalem. President Carter thought that Sadat and Begin should come to Camp David for peace talks. A summit would force the two leaders to peace and a mediator would be a bridge between these two gaps. Sadat and Israeli leader Begin accepted the American proposal and finally, on September 17, 1978, the Camp David peace accords were signed at the White House. There were three sides in the Camp David peace: Egypt, Israel and the United States. The agreement affected Egypt much more than the others. First of all, Egypt was excluded from the Arab world and internationally isolated. But Egypt strengthened its relations with the western world, especially with the United States, and the U.S. government's aid began to flow to Egypt. Israel gained a lot from the peace with Egypt. Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt but gained a free hand in the West Bank and Gaza. With the Camp David agreement, Israel eliminated its most dangerous enemy, Egypt. While Israel strengthened its presence in the occupied territories, it also became more powerful in dealing with Arab states after pacifying Egypt. Undoubtedly, signing the Camp David accords satisfied President Jimmy Carter and gave him much prestige. The Camp David agreement was a result of his long efforts, but unfortunately it did not help Carter to get reelected as American president.

ÖZET

'Camp David Barış Anlaşması' Mısır ve İsrail arasındaki barış süreci Enver Sedat'ın Mısır'da başa geçmesiyle başladı. Enver Sedat Altı-Gün savaşlarıyla bozulmuş olan Mısır ile Batı ülkeleri arasındaki ilişkileri düzeltme yollarını aradı. Sedat İsrail'le barışı gerçekten istedi ve bu uğurda Kudüs'ü ziyaret etti. Başkan Carter Sedat ve Begin'in Camp David'e gelerek barış görüşmelerine başlamalarının faydalı olacağını düşündü. Bir zirve iki tarafı barış için zorlayabilir ve bir aracı da iki taraf arasındaki mesafeyi kapatmak için bir köprü vazifesi görebilirdi. Sedat ve İsrail lideri Begin Amerikan teklifini kabul etti ve sonuçta 17 Eylül 1978'de Camp David barışını Beyaz Sarayda imzaladılar. Camp David barışında üç taraf vardı: Mısır, İsrail ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri. Anlaşma Mısır'ı diğer ikisinden daha çok etkiledi. Her şeyden önce Mısır Arap dünyasından ihraç edildi ve uluslararası bir yalnızlığa itildi. Buna rağmen Mısır Batı dünyası, özellikle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, ile ilişkilerini güçlendirdi ve Mısır'a Amerikan yardımları akmaya

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başladı. İsrail Mısır'la olan bu anlaşmadan çok şey kazandı. İsrail Sina yarımadasını Mısır'a geri verdi ancak Batı Şeria ve Gazze üzerinde otoritesini arttırmak için serbest kaldı. İsrail Camp David anlaşmasıyla en kuvvetli düşmanı olan Mısır tehlikesini ortadan kaldırdı. Mısır'ın pasifize edilmesinden sonra İsrail bir yandan işgal topraklarında otoritesini arttırırken diğer taraftan da diğer Arap devletleriyle olan pazarlıklarda daha güçlü bir konuma geldi. Süphesiz ki Camp David barışının imzalanması Carter'i mutlu etti ve ona büyük prestij kazandırdı. Bu anlaşma Carter'in uzun çabaları sonucunda gerçekleşmişti ancak ne var ki bu başarı Carter'in Amerikan Başkanlığı'na ikinci kez seçilmesine yetmedi.

PRESIDENT SADAT AND PEACE PROCESS

The peace process between Egypt and Israel started when Anwar Sadat came to power in Egypt after Gamal Abdul Nasser. Sadat was different from Nasser but, as vice-President, remained under Nasser's shadow. Unlike Nasser, Sadat was moderate and he thought that Egypt was misled during Nasser's presidency. Under his reign, Egypt was involved in bad economic, political, and social situations. During his vice-presidency in Nasser's administration, Sadat had a chance to know his people and searched and analyzed Egyptians' reaction to Nasser's administration. He concluded that Egyptians and Arabs would never rest easy until they regained their self-respect and their lands. (Kamel, 1986: 10.)

As president, Sadat gradually changed traditional Egyptian foreign policy and delicately approached the western world, especially the United States. Sadat fought against domestic problems, especially economic problems, and tried to change Egypt's foreign policy. As early as 1971, Sadat attempted to negotiate Sinai's situation with Israel, but the Israeli government completely rejected the Egyptian initiative.

At the beginning of Sadat's presidency, he first strengthened his authority and sought to restore international relations with the western hemisphere, which were broken by the Six-Day war. In 1971, he used the army to smash his domestic enemies. (Aronson, 1978: 145.) Then, he prepared army to fight Israel to regain Egypt's land and the people's glory. In addition to military and territorial reasons, Sadat went to war for economic gains. The war between Egypt and Israel could bring Arab economic aid for what Egypt urgently needed. After the war, Egypt received \$500 million aid from Arab states. (Mansur, 1985: 3.)

The war of 1973 against Israel brought a fortune to Sadat at home. He gained prestige and considerable power to dictate his domestic policies. In 1974, Sadat inaugurated an "infatih" policy on the economy. It was Egypt's

“open door” policy. To achieve this policy, Egypt needed \$10-12 billion for the next five years but Sadat had difficulties to find the money. When Sadat requested this money from rich Arab states, they granted only 2 billion Egyptian pounds. (Mansur, 1985: 43-44.) The Soviets could not help Sadat because he wanted to change Egypt’s Soviet centered foreign policy. Sadat had rejected a Soviet alliance and had ousted some 17.000 Soviet technicians from Egypt. Sadat, then, turned to the west for aid. Nixon’s “Detente” policy with the Soviet Union encouraged Sadat to reestablish relations with the United States. (Mansur, 1985: 41.) But, Egypt needed to de-escalate conflict with Israel to warm the relations with the United States. Consequently, Egypt gradually warmed up its relations with Israel. In 1974 and 1975, Egypt and Israel signed agreements over the Sinai and Israel left some strategic parts of territory and some oil wells to Egypt. In June 1974, President Nixon’s visit to Egypt constituted a notable point to normalize Egyptian-American relations.

GROWING STRUGGLE AND HOPES FOR PEACE

1977 was a turning point in the peace process between Egypt and Israel. With the election of 1977, Jimmy Carter came to power in the United States and that same year the Israeli election brought Menachem Begin to power in Israel. During winter and spring of 1977, Carter’s Middle East policy was shaped. Carter adopted former Secretary of State Kissinger’s “step by step” policy to improve the peace process. (Aronson, 1986: 331.)

President Carter paid great attention to the Middle East peace process. After the establishment of the state of Israel, generally, every single American president paid great attention to Middle East policies and they formed their own formulas for peace. President Carter also created his own Middle East peace policies according to his personal and political peculiarities. He reflected his deep Baptist belief and idealism on the peace issue. (Bickerton / Klausner, 1995: 195.) Besides his primordial values, he politically was aware that the United States needed stability in the Middle East. Because, after the 1962 Cuban Missiles crisis, no event had terribly jeopardized American interests and put the United States in face to face conflict with the Soviets, but the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and Arab oil embargo did accomplish this. (Beling, 1986: 75.)

President Carter adopted the brooking formula, and according to this formula, Arab-Israeli relations would be normalized if Israel withdrew its forces from occupied territories to the pre-1967 lines with small changes and also establish a homeland for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

(Aronson, 1978: 358.) In spite of Soviet and American delegation, which met in New York, on September 30, 1977, to negotiate the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II), surprisingly, American State Secretary and Soviet Foreign Minister, Cyrus Vance and Andrei Gromyko, agreed on a framework for a Geneva conference about the Middle East peace process. (Armaoğlu, 1994: 379.) According to the Soviet-American Communiqué declaration reached at this meeting, Israel would withdraw its troops from the occupied territories, Palestinians would have an independent state and every state would be secure, including Israel and the state of war would terminate between Israel and the Arab states. (Bradley, 1981: 14.)

Carter had seen the Soviet Union as a necessary participant for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Carter had tried to accommodate the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O) and Syria in his peace project, stating that American recognition of Palestinians' rights and the principle of a homeland for the Palestinians were important. (Aronson, 1978: 359.) Jimmy Carter was the first American president, who attempted to legitimate Palestinian nationalism. (Tschirgi, 1989: 217.) When President Carter spoke on behalf of the Palestinians, and his peace thesis was close to the Arabs' idea, he sought at the same time to strength the Israeli position in the Middle East. He signed a military treaty with Israel, including a possible U.S. base in Israel, to establish a security zone and early warning system in this area. (Aronson, 1978: 343.) During the Carter administration America provided \$10.6 billion to Israel; however, America had only granted \$360 million in aid from the establishment of Israel to Carter administration. (Tschirgi, 1989: 98.)

Soviet-American declaration of New York created a hurricane both in the Israeli Knesset and American Congress. Israel absolutely rejected this initiative. Some American policymakers, especially the Israeli lobby, opposed the declaration, and they did not want to share the American Middle East policy with the Soviet Union. According to these politicians, cooperation with the Soviets was unnecessary. In response to adamant opposition to from both Israel and American Congress, Carter began to retreat from his Middle-East project, which recognized rights for Palestinians.

Israel prepared a working paper for the Geneva conference and offered it to the American government on October 5, 1977. According to the "working paper," Palestinians would discuss the future of the West Bank and Gaza, although they would not be invited to enter the working group. (Bradley, 1981: 16.) The American government accepted the Israeli revision

on the Geneva meeting, but the Arabs did not. (Armaoğlu, 1994: 381.) The idea of the Geneva peace meeting was an absolute failure. The American government almost changed its policy about the Geneva conference. Influential writer Uri Avnery stated that, “the joint American-Soviet communiqué was killed by the Americans two weeks after its birth.” (Avnery, 1986: 114.)

In May 1977, with the Israeli election, the *Likud* block came to power and twenty-nine years of *Labor* dominance ended in Israel. Menachem Begin, who was the leader of the fundamental nationalist *Herut Party*, became Prime Minister. Begin¹ inaugurated the new phase in Israeli foreign policy. Begin’s fundamental ideological principle was based on the integrity of Palestine, which was determined in 1919, including areas of western Palestine and Trans-Jordan, under Israeli state. He opposed the establishment of Jordan, because he considered Jordan’s territory to be a part of Israel. In his view, the Six-Day war was a liberation war. (Benvenisti, 1986: 56.) Begin called the West Bank, Judea and Samaria as in biblical terms. Thus, he adamantly defended that Judea and Samaria were a part of Israel. In the *Likud* coalition platform of 1977, a policy on the West Bank and peace issue was described as:

Judea and Samaria will not be handed to any foreign administration; between the sea and Jordan, there will only be Israeli sovereignty.... The Likud government will place its aspirations for peace at the top of priorities and will spare no effort to promote peace.... The Likud government’s peace initiative will be positive. Directly or through a friendly state, Israel will invite her neighbor in hold direct negotiations in order to sign peace agreements without pre-conditions on other side and without any solution formula invented by outsiders.” (Laqueur / Rubin, 1984: 23.)

Because of Israel’s political culture which frequently brought coalition governments to the power, Israeli domestic politics and coalition parties’ electoral interests substantially influenced Israeli foreign policies. The *Likud* coalition led by Begin was established by four political parties and the Begin

¹ Begin was an Israeli extremist and he spent his life on behalf of Zionism. of Polish origin, he lived for a long time in Russia. He was Revisionist and one of the followers of the *Revisionist Zionist Zeev Jabotinsky*. In 1942, Begin was imprisoned in the Soviet Union and later he was allowed to go to the Palestine as a part of a Polish army unit. When he arrived in Palestine, he joined the underground *Irgun* organization to fight for Israel’s independence. He participated in bombing the *King David Hotel* and in the *Deir Yassin* massacre. For some people, he was a terrorist. In fact, Begin was not allowed into England because he was “persona non grata” for English government. (Kamel, 1986: 12.)

administration was dependent on the votes of the four extreme orthodox *Agudat Israel* members of the Knesset. (Avnery, 1986: 159.) Begin, himself, was political extremist but he also needed to satisfy other extremist members of his Cabinet as well as to participate in the peace process with Egypt. Therefore, Begin refused to compromise about the West Bank, but he wanted to keep the doors open for negotiations. When he adopted tough policies in peace process, at the same time, Begin sent out secret feelers to President Sadat and helped to prepare the ground for Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. (Shlaim / Yaniv: 316.)

PRESIDENT SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE

Whatever their political conditions and the preferences were, both Israel and Egypt sought peace. Two adverse countries had little chance for direct bilateral talks and they needed third party mediation. In September 1977, Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, visited Morocco and asked King Hassan II for help establishing direct contact between Israel and Egypt. King Hassan welcomed Dayan's request and he arranged meeting between Dayan and Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt, General Hassan Tohami in Morocco. (Tessler, 1994: 508-509.)

President Sadat genuinely wanted peace with Israel. Sadat had no any prejudice toward Begin. When he was asked about new Israeli prime minister, he asserted that Begin was not different from former Israeli prime ministers such as Golda Meir or Yitzak Rabin. Instead Israeli leader Begin's extreme political stand, he was aware that peace with Egypt would help Israeli security and would enormously strengthen Israel's political status in the region. (Kamel, 1986: 12.)

An unexpected attempt was made by President Sadat for peace. When he addressed the Egyptian National Assembly on October 9, 1977, he asserted that he was ready to go to a Geneva conference to defend Palestinian rights and regain Arab territories. He was ready to go everywhere for peace even ready to go to the Jews' home to the Knesset. Sadat's speech surprised not only Israel but the entire world. Begin replied to Sadat's speech. On October 15, the Israeli Knesset passed a resolution to invite the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem. First of all, the Israeli government intended to invite Syrian President Hafez Assad, Jordanian King Hussein and Lebanese President Elias Sarkis in addition to President Sadat, but later changed its mind. (Armaoğlu, 1994: 381.) The U.S. Ambassador to Egypt handed President Sadat an official Israeli invitation to visit Jerusalem. President Sadat accepted the Israeli official invitation.

President Sadat arrived in Jerusalem on October 19, 1977 and gave a speech at the Knesset on October 20, in his speech; he said that he had first declared his willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel on February 4, 1971. According to him, this was the first declaration made by an Arab leader since the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict. "I have not come here for a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not part of the policy of Egypt. The problem is not that of Egypt and Israel," said Sadat. President Sadat complained that the Arabs had ignored Israel and did not recognize Israeli sovereignty but, now, Arabs were ready to live in peace with Israel. In conclusion, he said, "We insist on complete withdrawal from occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem." (Laqueur / Rubin, 1984: 593-593.)

Arab reactions were different to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The first reaction came from the Egyptian cabinet. When Sadat decided to go to Jerusalem his foreign minister Ismail Fahmi opposed Sadat and resigned. Sadat appointed Mohamed Riad as foreign minister but in a few hours he also resigned. Finally, Sadat appointed Boutros Ghali as foreign minister. (Armaoğlu, 1994: 282.) Morocco and Sudan welcomed Sadat's visit. Saudi Arabia made no comment. The other Arab countries and the P.L.O. strongly opposed Sadat's visit. (Bradley, 1981: 21.) The Arabs considered that Sadat had betrayed Arabs' common goal. On December 5, 1977, *the Arab League* met in Tripoli, in Libya. In the summit declaration, the participant Arab states considered that the Egyptian government aimed at liquidating the Arab issue and the issue of Palestine, split the Arab nation and forfeited its national interests. Sadat sacrificed the Egyptians and their armed struggle as well as the principles of the Arab nation. In a common decision the Arab states decided to freeze relations with Egypt. (Laqueur / Rubin, 1984: 603-605.)

Peace talks were increasingly continued between Egypt and Israel after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. On December 25, 1977, Sadat and Begin met in Ismailiyye in Egypt. These two countries established a peace team to argue problems. The U.S. government paid great attention to Sadat's initiative and peace talks. President Carter visited Egypt and met with President Sadat. In Carter's speech on January 4, 1978, in Aswan, Egypt, Carter discussed his ideas about the future peace in the Middle East. He referred to U.N. resolutions 242 and 338. In President Carter's opinion, Israel should withdrawal from occupied territories and legitimize the rights of the Palestinian people, and they should determine their own future. (Laqueur / Rubin, 1984: 608-609.)

CAMP DAVID PEACE TALKS

Meetings between Israeli and Egyptian peace teams did not achieve expected goal. America started to produce its own plan under Secretary of State, Vance. On July 20, 1978, President Carter discussed with his advisors that Sadat and Begin should come to Camp David for peace talks. A summit would force the two leaders to peace and a mediator would be a bridge between these two gaps. His advisors accepted Carter's idea. (Quandt, 1993: 276.)

President Carter's official invitation was accepted by both Israel and Egypt. Sadat had denied an agreement between Egypt and Israel because the problem was not only an Egypt and Israeli problem. The problem was between all Arabs and Israel. In spite of his thinking, he readily accepted Carter's invitation. According to high ranking Egyptian politician Mahmoud Riad, Sadat was going to go to America to salvage the failure of the Ismailiyye meeting. (Riad, 1981: 320.) Every side started to work for the Camp David meeting. Carter spent most of his time preparing for the meeting. Carter worked out the details of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty including specific security arrangements. President Carter was highly optimistic that the Camp David meeting would be successful and bring an agreement. (Quandt, 1993: 278.) In Israel, the Begin cabinet held many meetings about peace with Egypt. The Israeli cabinet became an arena of verbal warfare. Actually, the Israeli cabinet met 162 times in 1977-78, of which 117 meetings were about peace negotiations and political matters concerning peace. (Shlaim / Yaniv: 328.) As for Egypt, according to Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, who joined the Camp David peace meetings, Sadat was not doing anything for Camp David. At that time Muslims were observing the holy month of Ramadan, and Sadat spent his time moving from one rest house to another. (Kamel, 1986: 271.)

When the Cabinet warned Sadat about the Jewish lobby in America that the lobby could pressure President Carter and himself to turn the tables on behalf of Israel, he refused the likelihood of lobby pressure on the meeting. But the American government was under the Jewish lobby pressure. Under this pressure, Carter had fired the American ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young after he met with P.L.O. representative to the U.N. (Hunter, 1987: 10.)

The Camp David meetings lasted between September 5-17, 1978. When Sadat arrived in the United States, he gave a short speech. He stated that,

We are interested in establishing a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and we always appreciated the United States' contribution to the peace process. We are now at the crossroads and are facing a great challenge. However, we have no alternative but to take up this challenge because we cannot disappoint the world's hopes for peace. We have no time for maneuvers or obsolete ideas. (Kamel, 1986: 299.)

The first day at the Camp David meetings, Sadat explained his peace proposal. According to his proposal, Israel would withdraw from the entire occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem, and the Arabs would recognize Israel's sovereignty. Arabs would abolish their boycott against Israel and the Suez Canal would open for free navigation. (Riad, 1981: 320.) Israel did not accept Sadat proposal. Israel could negotiate the status of the Sinai but never the West Bank and Gaza. For the Israeli government, these territories were a natural part of Israel and nobody could claim these territories. Begin asserted that Jerusalem was the eternal capital of Israel, and Israel would not return to the boundaries of 1967. The Israeli army also would remain in the West Bank and Gaza. (Riad, 1981: 318.) The Israeli delegate also requested a written pledge that the US would not take initiatives without prior consultation with Israel. (Riad, 1981: 321.)

President Sadat had no trump card to play at Camp David. Israel did not have vital interests in the meeting as Egypt had, because Egypt had lost a significant part of its territory and had been trying to regain its territory and honor. The statement by a senior member of Begin's government is an example of this sense. He told Egyptian delegate member Ibrahim Kamel when Sadat visited Jerusalem, "why have you come to Jerusalem? We are satisfied with the present situation and our occupation of the land we have liberated. Peace at present is not in our interest." (Kamel, 1986: 308.)

President Carter concluded that there would not be an agreement if Israel insisted on remaining in Sinai and that there would not be an agreement if Egypt insisted on the liberation of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel did not want to give up Sinai because they had constructed airbases and established settlements in the peninsula. So the Israeli team's uncompromising manner put the meeting in deadlock. When Sadat met with Israeli foreign minister Moshe Dayan, he felt that there would be no compromise; they were just wasting their time. During this meeting, Dayan told Sadat if he wanted to sign a real peace with Israel "you must take all your people out of Sinai, the troops and civilians, dismantle the military camps and remove the settlements." He also stated that Israel would continue to occupy the Sinai and pump oil. When Sadat told Dayan that

Israel had not said this before, Dayan replied that the Israelis stated this earlier but that the Egyptians did not want to believe it. (Kamel, 1986: 351.)

Although Israeli and Egyptian teams spent a long time discussing such issues, there was no progress. On September 15, President Sadat wanted to withdraw from the Camp David meetings. His attitude jeopardized all hopes, especially Carter's hopes for peace. When Sadat met with Carter to say goodbye, Carter certainly opposed his leaving. According to Ibrahim Kamel, at this meeting, President Carter had found a formula to prevent the failure of the Camp David meetings. Carter strongly advised Sadat to sign an agreement with Israel at Camp David. The signed agreement needed approval of both the Israeli Knesset and the Egyptian National Assembly to be valid. If Sadat did not like the agreement, the Assembly could reject it. According to Carter, Camp David meetings should end signing an agreement because he expected imported political gains from the meetings. After meeting Carter, Sadat said, "I shall sign anything proposed by President Carter without reading it." (Kamel, 1986: 357.)

Some Egyptian delegates claimed that Carter would aid Egypt as he had aided Israel, if Sadat did not leave the meeting. But President Carter denied this assertion. (Quandt, 1986: 339.) According to Carter's security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter warned that if Sadat left:

It will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt. There is no way we can explain this to our people. It would mean an end to this peacekeeping effort, into which I have put so much investment. It would probably mean the end of my Presidency because this whole effort will be discredited.... (Quandt, 1986: 339.)

Actually signing a peace agreement at Camp David was very important for Carter. The Camp David peace process had started with Carter's initiative. A peace signing would be first of all a success for President Carter and would help him for his next year's presidential election. Carter made Sadat stay at the meeting and tried to find a solution to the peace process. Carter explained his plan and gave priority to the Sinai issue. If Israel left its airbases in Sinai, the U.S. would grant \$3 billion aid to Israel to build airbases in the Israeli Negev. After Carter's meeting with the Israeli team, Carter assured Sadat that Israel would freeze its settlements in the Sinai. Carter also put a five year limit to solve the West Bank and Gaza problems. (Quandt, 1986: 241-242.)

CONCLUDING THE PEACE AND ITS REACTIONS

After long, tiresome negotiations and spending great efforts, finally, on September 17, 1978, the Camp David peace accords were signed with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at the White House. The American President signed this agreement as a witness. There were two accords in the Camp David agreement. The first one was an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the other one was the West Bank and Gaza framework. According to the Egyptian Israeli agreement, Israel would return the entire Sinai Peninsula within two or three years after the peace treaty was signed. But the Egyptian military forces would be limited in the Sinai. The two states would enter into full diplomatic and economic relations without any restrictions. With this agreement Israel would have free shipping rights on the Suez Canal and the straits of Tiran. The second agreement was about the West Bank and Gaza. First of all, Egypt and Israel would make overall arrangements for a five-year transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza. The future of the West Bank and Gaza would be determined by Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. In a third year, concerned sides would begin negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. (Bradley, 1981: 33.)

The Camp David peace agreement promised Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, but it did not happen. After signing of the Camp David accords, the Palestinians' situation was worsened in occupied territories. The Camp David peace agreement ignored the status of Jerusalem; nothing was specified about Jerusalem in the peace agreement.

Sadat's signing the agreement with Israel separately from the Arab world made Arabs angry. The Arab League countries met in Baghdad, Iraq in March, 1979. The Arab summit declared its common initiative that the Arab countries withdraw their ambassadors from Egypt and Egyptian membership to *the Arab League* would be suspended. (Laqueur / Rubin, 1984: 617.)

President Carter hoped that Camp David would motivate the other Arab countries into the peace process with Israel but after the Camp David, Arabs were not motivated but angry. At the time of the signing of the Camp David accords, Jordanian King Hussein and his wife were in Spain as guests of the Spanish King. When the King heard the signing of the Camp David accords on the radio, he was shocked. King Hussein and his wife immediately turned back to Amman. (Wallach, 1990: 309.) The Saudi King asserted that Israel intended the Camp David Accords to be the penultimate step toward peace.

This agreement made only cosmetic changes, but no real concessions on Palestinian rights. (Beling, 1986: 61.) Syrian president Hafez Assad claimed that Israel would not withdraw from the Sinai and blamed Sadat distinguishing his territory from Arab territories. According to Assad, Syria would continue to support the Palestinian revolution. (Laqueur / Rubin, 1984: 621.) The other reaction came from the Soviet Union. Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko rejected the Camp David agreement. In his view, Israel should withdrawal from the entire occupied territories for a comprehensive agreement. (Laqueur / Rubin, 1984: 618.)

The Israeli Knesset met on September 27, 1978 to vote on the Camp David peace accords. After lengthy arguments, the Knesset voted 84 in favor, 19 opposed, and 17 abstentions. (Quandant, 1986: 288.) The Egyptian National Assembly also voted on the Camp David Accords, with an overwhelming majority in favor. Finally, after the ratification of the agreement in both parliaments, Israel gradually withdrew its forces and left the entire Sinai, including airbases and oil fields, to Egypt under U.N. supervision.

CONCLUSION

There were three sides in the Camp David peace: Egypt, Israel and the United States. The agreement affected Egypt much more than the others. First of all, Egypt was excluded from the Arab world and internationally isolated. But Egypt strengthened its relations with the western world, especially with the United States, and the U.S. government's aid began to flow to Egypt. In actuality, Egypt traditionally has been receiving the second largest amount of American foreign aid after Israel. After signing the Camp David peace, Egypt lost leadership of the Arab world. Domestically, Sadat was protested by Egyptians. Despite Sadat administration had highly criticized Nasser's economic policy, Sadat also failed to improve the Egyptian economy with American assistance and this increased opposition against him. Especially demoralized Egyptian youth and political, economic and social problems, which also fostered religious resentment created hatred against Sadat. Taking back the Sinai was not compelling reason to support Sadat. In reverse, like other Arabs, many Egyptians felt that Sadat betrayed the Arab cause. Finally, on October 6, 1981, President Anwar Sadat was assassinated when he was celebrating anniversary of October War.

Israel gained a lot from the peace with Egypt. Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt but gained a free hand in the West Bank and Gaza. With the Camp David agreement, Israel eliminated its most dangerous enemy, Egypt. While

Israel strengthened its presence in the occupied territories, it also became more powerful in dealing with Arab states after pacifying Egypt. In spite of the conditions of the Camp David agreement, Israel increasingly continued new settlements in the occupied territories. Israel also officially integrated the occupied Golan Heights. The Camp David agreement worsened the Palestinian situation in Israel. The Israeli government interpreted Camp David agreement to mean that Palestinian autonomy was not meant to establish a Palestinian state, and Israel did not improve Palestinians' rights in the occupied territories. Later, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek publicly announced that Palestinian rights were not Egyptian national interests. The Palestinians needed to rely on their own power in the struggle with Israel.

In time, Israel achieved some diplomatic successes after signing the Camp David peace accords. Egypt was the first Arab country to recognize Israel but Camp David was just a beginning for the peace process in the Middle East. Gradually other Arabs such as, Jordanians and Palestinians became involved into the Middle East peace process.

Undoubtedly, signing the Camp David accords satisfied President Jimmy Carter and gave him much prestige. The Camp David agreement was a result of his long efforts, but unfortunately it did not help Carter to get reelected as American president.

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